On aims and methods of psychiatry – a reminiscence of 50 years of Tinbergen’s famous questions about the biology of behavior by Martin Brüne
Brüne BMC Psychiatry  (2014) 14:1695 
DOI 10.1186/s12888-014-0364-yDEBATE Open AccessOn aims and methods of psychiatry – a
reminiscence of 50 years of Tinbergen’s famous
questions about the biology of behavior
Martin BrüneAbstract
Background: In 1963, Nicolaas Tinbergen published an article on “the aims and methods of ethology” in which he
identified a fundamental framework for the scientific inquiry into the understanding of biological phenomena. In
particular, he emphasized to not only study what he called the “proximate” causes, that is, mechanism and
ontogeny of a given trait, but to include evolutionary explanations, i.e., the phylogeny and adaptive properties of
that trait.
Discussion: While influential in the field of biology and to some degree medicine, psychiatry has fallen short of
adopting Tinbergen’s approach. This article aims at discussing why Tinbergen’s précis has lost nothing of its
attractiveness to psychiatry as a medical discipline. Examples will be given for the analysis of emotions, attachment
and psychotherapy.
Summary: Tinbergen has bequeathed to us a scientific framework that can greatly advance our understanding of
psychiatric conditions and improve diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders, with similar potential for medicine
in general.
Keywords: Evolution, Mechanism, Ontogeny, Phylogeny, Adaptation, Psychiatric conditions, Emotions, Mismatch,
Dysfunction, PsychotherapyBackground
Fifty years ago, in 1963, Nicolaas Tinbergen, at that time
Lecturer at Oxford University, United Kingdom, pub-
lished a paper entitled “On the Aims and Methods of
Ethology” on the occasion of Konrad Lorenz’s 60th birth-
day. Both Tinbergen and Lorenz, together with Karl von
Frisch, were awarded the Nobel prize in medicine in
1973 for their ground-breaking work in the field of eth-
ology). Tinbergen’s paper became influential in biology,
because it provided a précis of scientific inquiry into the
biological study of (animal) behavior. In particular,
Tinbergen pointed out that, for a full understanding of an
observable biological phenomenon (movement or behav-
ior), it is necessary to analyze four different, though re-
lated, aspects: its causation (or mechanism), its ontogeny
(developmental trajectory), its survival value (biologicalCorrespondence: martin.bruene@rub.de
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unless otherwise stated.fitness) and its evolutionary (phylogenetic) history. Scientific
inquiries into mechanisms and development are referred
to as the “proximate” causes [1], because they are malle-
able during an individual’s lifetime and strongly depend on
gene-environment interaction, and, as we know today, epi-
genetic mechanisms [2]. The other two aspects, fitness
and phylogeny have been called “ultimate” or evolutionary
causes. Understanding the evolutionary causes of behavior
entails exploring similarities and dissimilarities between
phylogenetically related species (comparative method),
and the analysis of the ecological contingencies in which a
given trait was shaped by selection [1]. Each area has a
corresponding question about the trait: How does it work?
How does it develop? What is its phylogeny? How has it
influenced biological fitness, that is, survival and repro-
ductive success?
Tinbergen’s article shortly followed Ernst Mayr’s ef-
forts to distinguish “proximate” from “ultimate” explana-
tions. Mayr’s book, The Growth of Biological Thought,
describes the history of biology as intertwined strandsan Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
rg/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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mechanisms and their ontogeny (proximate), the other
about why traits are the way they are, that is, evolution
[3,4]. “Evolutionary” has mostly replaced the term “ul-
timate” to avoid its slightly supernatural tinge [5]. Mayr
notes, “No biological problem is solved until both the
proximate and the evolutionary causation has been elu-
cidated. Furthermore, the study of evolutionary causes is
as legitimate a part of biology as is the study of the usu-
ally physico-chemical proximate causes.”
Why is this relevant to psychiatry? Psychiatric research
and neuroscience has made tremendous progress in ex-
ploring the proximate causes of psychopathology, that is,
its underlying mechanisms (e.g., aberrant neurotransmis-
sion, abnormalities in brain structure and function, discov-
ery of genes increasing the risk for dysfunction etc.). By
comparison, relatively few studies have explicitly sought to
address psychiatric conditions by taking into account the
adaptive properties of the brain/mind including behavior,
cognitive traits or emotions etc.. Indeed, such an approach
is all but straightforward, it seems, because many clini-
cians would intuitively argue, from a medical point of
view, that bodies are optimal by evolutionary design, sug-
gesting that every (behavioral) dysfunction is an expres-
sion of a pathological process affecting the respective
output organ (e.g., the heart or the brain). Related to this,
dysfunction is often deemed qualitatively different from
function, which remains in the most recent classification
of psychiatric conditions, the DSM-5 [6]. This view, how-
ever, disregards observations that most, if not all, psycho-
pathological signs and symptoms differ from “normalcy”
be degree, not kind.
In this article, it is proposed that human behavior –
both normal and pathological – can be, and needs to be,
studied along the lines proposed by Tinbergen, which
decisively includes an evolutionary perspective. Specific-
ally, it is asserted that psychiatry (and medicine in gen-
eral) cannot make progress without acknowledging the
fact that human cognition, emotions and behavior have
evolved, and continue to evolve [7], in precisely the same
way as any other observable phenomenon in any living
creature. Without a deeper understanding of the bio-
logical and environmental contingencies, including their
interactions, and of the evolutionary history of any given
traits, many psychopathological conditions remain elu-
sive with respect to their origins, which limits potential
treatment options.
This article takes the 50th anniversary of Tinbergen’s
publication as an opportunity to consider how his four
questions can clarify the aims and methods of psychiatry.
It is contended that a systematic application of Tinbergen’s
questions can help psychiatry the way they have advanced
the study of animal behavior. A few examples will be of-
fered to illustrate the opportunity; emotions and theirdisorders, attachment and its disorders, and some poten-
tial implications for treatment. A question central to evo-
lutionary medicine is at the core of this approach: Why
has natural selection left the human mind so vulnerable to
dysfunction? Related to this, one can ask more specifically:
Why do negative emotions persist, given the suffering they
cause and their role in causing disease? Why do so many
people have attachment patterns that are insecure, given
the dire effects on relationships? How can all this help to
tailor individualized psychotherapy?
Natural defenses, “smoke detectors” and environmental
mismatch
Homo sapiens is a product of evolution by natural selec-
tion. Although many characteristics evolved in our ances-
tral past as hunter-gatherers, known as the “environment
of evolutionary adaptedness” (EEA; [8], there is evidence to
suggest that our species continues to evolve and to adapt to
new environmental challenges [7]. In the evolutionary past,
humans faced threats in many divergent domains, ranging
from microbial pathogens attacking the immune system to
inter-group conflict between competing tribes. Thus, the
EEA was anything but a stable condition; in fact, as envir-
onmental contingencies changed, so did adaptive solutions.
Put differently, evolution by natural selection has continu-
ously produced answers to changing biological challenges
affecting reproductive fitness, whereby many different
defense mechanisms emerged, often following the “Red
Queen” principle (so named after “Alice in Wonderland”
whereby the Red Queen runs ever faster just to remain
where she is!) or in an “arms race” fashion [9]. This pro-
poses that organisms must constantly adapt, evolve, and
proliferate not merely to gain reproductive advantage, but
also simply to survive while pitted against ever-evolving
opposing organisms in an ever-changing environment.
Viewed this way, it follows that bodies, organs or individual
traits are never optimal by design, but work sufficiently re-
liably to maintain homeostasis and to respond to imbal-
ance thereof. With regard to defense mechanism, the
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal system has properties that
enable organisms to cope with stress, yet there are huge
between-species differences with regard to the regulation
of chronic stress [10] and within-species differences with
regard to stress resilience [11]. A substantial number of
people now suffer from posttraumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) that is often precipitated by adverse events such
as neglect, abuse or other severe psychological trauma
[12]. Such traumatizing events were perhaps not prevalent
enough in our evolutionary past to impact biological fit-
ness. Hence, no specialized or unique coping mechanisms
evolved to these “unnatural” challenges [13].
Fear responses to real or imagined environmental
threats may be elicited by contextual factors that more or
less resemble ancestral hazards. Insight comes from signal
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at low thresholds, which comes at the risk of producing
false alarms. Smoke detectors are purposefully designed so
by human technicians, because a missed alarm response
would be more costly than a false alarm. Nature has se-
lected defense responses that work analogously, in
principle, to a domestic smoke alarm or detector. For ex-
ample, anxiety may help protect an individual from falling
prey to a predator or succumb in intra-species conflict
[14]. Likewise, low mood or (mild) depression may occur
as a protective response to social stress, wherein an indi-
vidual feels entrapped in unresolved conflict or defeated in
social contest [15]. Depression and anxiety can thus be
considered in psychiatry as analogous to cough and fever
in medicine. They are undesirable, but often necessary de-
fenses against environmental adversity, and may help re-
implement physical and psychological homeostasis [16].
Such mechanisms may themselves become disadvanta-
geous or even life-threatening, if they progress beyond a
certain critical value or “threshold”. Like fever and cough
can promote sickness and even death (if unsuccessful in
eliminating their pathogenic cause), anxiety and depres-
sion can become highly dysregulated (e.g., if defeat or en-
trapment become chronic), such that individuals are no
longer able to cope with the situation and instead, may de-
velop suicidal ideas [17]. Similar responses to threat can
be observed in nonhuman primates and other animals,
and abundant research in this area has elucidated the
underlying defense mechanisms e.g., [18-20]. These exam-
ples, presented in a nutshell, may illustrate the importance
of inquiry into the evolutionary causes of emotions, that
is, their phylogeny and adaptive properties.
When reading Tinbergen’s paper carefully, one recog-
nizes that the “three major problems of biology” (mechan-
ism, phylogeny, adaptive value) were already carved out by
Julian Huxley [21] to whom Tinbergen gives full credit for
his insights [1, p. 411]. The fourth dimension of scientific
inquiry, ontogeny, was added by Tinbergen. It is perhaps
the most relevant for the understanding of human behav-
ior and psychopathology, because it refers to the pertinent
question of “innate” versus “acquired”, “instinctive” versus
“learnt”, or “nature” versus “nurture”. In fact, as we will
see in the next section, it was one of Tinbergen’s great in-
sights to discover, and lay down the theoretical foundation
of, the “ontogenetic interaction between the individual
and its environment – which, incidentally, takes the form
of trial and error only where evolution has not given pre-
cise direction to the ontogenetic process” [p. 426] – that
is, an individual’s behavioral ecology.
Attachment, life history patterns, and reproduction
Mammals, and to a lesser degree birds, represent a taxo-
nomic group of animals that critically depend on paren-
tal care during the early stages of development [22]. In theprimate lineage that led to the evolution of Homo sapiens,
the extremely prolonged periods of infancy and childhood
fostered the emergence of empathic concern for others
[23]. One decisive ecological factor that accelerated the
evolution of close relationships between infants and care-
givers in human predecessors was a change in climatic
conditions with the emergence of open savannas, which
provided selection pressures favouring bipedalism (upright
walking). Over evolutionary time, the brains of ancestral
bipedal hominids started to grow larger due to other selec-
tion pressures related to increasing social complexity [24].
Bipedalism, combined with the limits of the female pelvis
with and the requirements for giving birth to infants with
large brains, necessitated the trade-off of giving birth to
increasingly immature offspring.
This prime example of an evolutionary design com-
promise is perhaps the one with the furthest-reaching
consequences for mental life. Indeed, “the obstetrical di-
lemma” [25] has profoundly impacted human parenting,
mating behavior, as well as the formation of trustful and
supportive relationships [26]. Immaturity of human new-
borns, for instance, favored the selection of close dyadic
relationships between mother and offspring. The British
psychoanalyst John Bowlby was probably the first to
recognize the importance of early mother-child relation-
ships for mental health. He coined the term “attach-
ment” [8] for proximity-seeking behavior of the baby,
which, according to Bowlby, was “preprogrammed”
(instinctual) as to secure survival. Interestingly, when
Bowlby started to present his ground-breaking ideas, he
was almost expelled from his psychoanalyst community,
because he apparently insisted on the relevance of (early)
human interaction for mental health, rather than acknow-
ledging the primacy of intrapsychic conflict as key to psy-
chopathology [27]. Consequently, Bowlby sought help in
the camp of ethologists, foremost Robert Hinde, who were
much more open to his ideas, as experimental research in
nonhuman primates readily substantiated Bowlby’s in-
sights e.g., [28].
Subsequent research in humans revealed that infants
differ with regard to their attachment style. The majority
develops a so-called secure attachment style, which is
characterized by the development of trustful “inner work-
ing models” (IWM; [8]. Trustful IWMs develop when
caregivers are responsive to infants’ needs. That is, care-
givers (not necessarily the biological mother) recognize
signs of distress in the child, are emotionally available,
provide a “safe haven” and validate children’s emotions in
supportive ways. Through this interaction, the child learns
to appreciate the world as a safe place, which forms the
basis for exploring the environment and becoming inde-
pendent over time. This includes the ability to form coher-
ent internal images of self and others as individuals with
distinctive mental operations.
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velop when caregivers are less or even unresponsive to
their infants’ needs. In fact, harsh and rejecting parent-
ing styles lead the child to appreciate the world as an
unsafe place, others as unreliable and untrustworthy.
Based on how young children respond to a “strange situ-
ation” [29] in which the child is first separated from and
subsequently reunites with her caregiver, attachment theo-
rists distinguish between anxious-ambivalent (clinging),
avoidant-ambivalent (pseudo-autonomous) and disorga-
nized attachment (freezing, stereotypic behavior).
Bowlby believed that secure attachment was the only
adaptive attachment style, and the others deviants from
the norm. This view, however, somehow disregarded the
ecological contingencies on the side of the parents (or
caregivers).
More recent conceptualizations of attachment suggest
that it could indeed be adaptive to accelerate the repro-
ductive cycle, when resources are scarce. Hence, if environ-
mental conditions are unstable or unpredictable, caregivers
may actually invest less in offspring compared to condi-
tions where resources are abundant. Viewed this way, in-
sensitive parental rearing styles not only promote the
development of mistrustful inner working models, they
also lead the offspring to reproduce earlier as prospects of
future resource availability are gloomy [30]. In such a situ-
ation it might be biologically adaptive to be less discrimina-
tive with regard to mate choice, to be exploitative in terms
of interpersonal relationships, and invest little in own off-
spring, which includes limited emotional availability.
Early environmental contingencies not only shape one’s
psychological development. There is now convincing evi-
dence for acceleration or delay of biological maturation,
depending on early developmental circumstances [31]. For
example, girls who grow up in families in which fathers
are absent or familial conditions are otherwise stressful,
reach menarche earlier compared to families with both
parents being present [32]. That is, children who grow up
in families with spousal harmony, low levels of stress and
adequate resources may also be experience greater emo-
tional availability of their caregivers (thus more often de-
velop secure attachment), which leads to later biological
maturation and mating. Also, securely attached individuals
seem to have more stable long-term intimate relationships
compared to individuals who as children have experienced
greater adversity. From a psychopathological point of view,
it is clear that differences in life history patterns do not ne-
cessarily correspond to mental health. Rather, it is obvious
that evolution has not selected for well-being, but instead,
for maximizing reproductive success. Consistent with this
notion, individuals who grew up under adverse conditions
are more likely to show more signs of psychological dis-
tress, with females presenting more internalizing problems
(such as anxiety and depression), whereas males moreoften display externalizing problems (antisocial behavior,
addiction). In extension to this, the tendency to choose a
mate with a similar psychological profile (assortative mat-
ing) may aggravate the situation. For example, depressed
women seem to often choose men as partners with anti-
social personalities, which increases (non-genetically) the
risk of offspring for developing a psychiatric condition [33].
Even though individual differences in behavioral ecol-
ogy seem to be mainly environmentally driven, there is
evidence to suggest that attachment style is influenced
by genetics [34]. However, the role of genetic variation
cannot be meaningfully interpreted without taking into
consideration the interaction of alleles with environmen-
tal contingencies.
In the context of gene-environment-interaction it seems
necessary to reframe the classic “diathesis-stress-model”,
according to which individuals are rendered more vulner-
able than others to developing psychological problems de-
pending on their genetic make-up. For example, research
has shown that individuals carrying the “short” variant of
the serotonin transporter coding gene predisposes to de-
pression in individuals who have experienced early adver-
sity such as neglect or abuse [35]. Similarly, carriers of the
low-activity variant of the MAO-A coding gene are at
greater risk of developing antisocial personality disorder
when growing up under adverse conditions [36]. Diathesis-
stress models are, however, insufficient to explain the
following observations: One is that several of the “vulner-
ability” genes have been positively selected during human
evolution. From an adaptationist point of view, it is simply
implausible to assume that natural selection has favored an
increase in frequency of allelic variants that convey vulner-
ability to psychological dysfunction. Second, there is grow-
ing evidence to suggest that the very same genetic variants
that only increase the risk of developing a psychiatric
condition if associated with adverse rearing conditions, can
lead to better than average outcomes when meeting
favorable early environmental condition (high-quality care-
giving). In support of this discovery, labeled “differential
genetic susceptibility”, research has revealed that the low-
activity variant of the MAO-A coding gene is associated
with lower than average prevalence of antisocial personal-
ity when individuals grew up in supportive environments
[37]. Along the same lines, carriers of the s-allele of the 5-
HTTLPR have a lower risk for depression under beneficial
early developmental conditions [38]. Moreover, individuals
carrying the seven-repeat variant of the DRD4 gene may
be exposed to a greater than average risk for ADHD and
externalizing problems, if growing up under unresponsive
care, whereas their risk for ADHD is lower than average, if
their mothers’ responsivity is superior [39]. Taken together,
early environmental conditions have a decisive impact on
how people perceive the world, form social relationships,
and even mature biologically. Selection has endowed
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contingencies that evolved to maximize reproductive suc-
cess. Such “open programs” [40] have the potential to pro-
duce both emotionally stable and unstable personalities,
but neither was a direct “goal” of evolution. In light of pro-
found skepticism of clinicians that evolutionary insights
can contribute to improving mental health [41], it is now
crucial to demonstrate exactly this.
Evolutionarily informed psychotherapy
The general purpose of psychotherapy is to improve pa-
tients’ subjective well-being and reduce suffering by
means of verbalizing interpersonal problems, validating
patients’ needs, and change attitudes, emotional ap-
praisal of difficulties, and problem behavior in the con-
text of a trustful client-therapist relationship. Studies
have shown that no one therapeutic “school” is superior
in efficacy over another. Instead, it seems that the qual-
ity of the therapeutic relationship is most essential [42].
This is unsurprising, given the relevance of early social
interaction for the formation of attachment and the per-
vasiveness and transference of attachment styles to other
relationships such as those to peers, friends, colleagues,
romantic partners and own offspring [27].
In an ideal world, primary prevention would aim at aid-
ing parents to provide optimal emotional care and re-
sources to their children, which could help infants to
develop secure attachment. In fact, preventative interven-
tions in problem families has revealed remarkable effects
on child development [43]. This may, however, be an un-
realistic goal for all to attain, yet therapeutic nihilism is
unwarranted in light of evidence for the malleability of at-
tachment styles over time [44]. Indicated prevention
(which, by definition, concerns the identification of indi-
viduals who are experiencing early signs or symptoms, but
have not yet reached the point where a clinical diagnosis
can be made) may be relevant for those individuals who
carry a substantial number of genetic variants that are
associated with increased differential susceptibility, since
research has shown additive effects with regard to an indi-
vidual’s responsivity to early environmental conditions,
mainly emotional availability of caregivers [45]; though it
is premature to advocate genetic testing and drawing sim-
plistic therapeutic or predictive correlations.
In addition to these insights from attachment theory,
the relevance of the evolutionary perspective assists up-
dating and reinterpretation of some classic psychoana-
lytic claims. One refers to the debate about incest taboo
and Freud’s seduction theory, according to which infant
sexuality fosters the oedipal conflict. There is now
evidence to suggest that psychoanalytic theory, in part,
confused cause and effect. Rather than proposing an un-
conscious wish of young children to have sex with the
opposite-sex parent, it is plausible to assume that severalof Freud’s patients were actually victims of sexual abuse
in the family, suggesting that many symptoms that Freud
observed emerged from early trauma [46]. In addition,
abundant research has shown that nature has selected
mechanisms of incest avoidance, which helps prevent
the accumulation of deleterious mutations [47].
Although clinicians rarely identify the contribution of
evolutionary theory to psychotherapy, Tinbergen’s ultim-
ate questions have also had considerable impact on psy-
choeducation in the cognitive behavioral treatment of
anxiety disorders, which includes models of causality ex-
plained to patients akin to the smoke detector principle
[48]. More specifically, recent psychotherapeutic devel-
opments such as metacognitive therapy, mentalization-
based therapy and compassion-focused therapy explicitly
refer to the ultimate causation of cognition, emotions
and behavior [49–51], with minor differences with re-
gard to their relatedness to classic attachment theory.
Another critical, and widely neglected, aspect pertaining
to patient-therapist interaction refers to the analysis of
nonverbal behavior during clinical settings. Studies have
demonstrated the predictive power of ethological analyses
of nonverbal interaction with regard to treatment response
and outcome that is superior to the utilization of classical
rating scales [52]. Ethological methodology as proposed by
Tinbergen [1] assigns nonverbal pattern of behavior a
communicative meaning. That is, drawing on between-
species as well as cross-cultural comparison, behaviors
observed in nonclinical subjects or psychiatric patients, in-
cluding those during social or therapeutic interaction, are
nonverbal correlates of internal emotional or motivational
states. For example, crouching postures, averted gaze or
self-directed activities such as grooming or locomotion are
nonverbal correlates of defense or ambivalence (fight or
flight).
Following these lines, numerous studies have demon-
strated that patients with psychiatric disorders can be
distinguished from nonclinical subjects on the basis of
their nonverbal behavior during social interaction [53].
Furthermore, there is convincing evidence that the pre-
diction of therapeutic response is reliably possible at a
very early stage of treatment, based on subtle nonverbal
signals which include facial movements, body posture
and movements directed towards the own body, in etho-
logical language referred to as “displacement activities”
[54]; reviewed in [53]. For example, Geerts et al. [55]
found that the lack of non-verbal convergence (nonver-
bal behavior of patient and interviewer becoming more
“attuned” over time) between the patients’ amount of
verbal material and the interviewers’ encouraging feed-
back (“yes” nodding, verbal back-channeling etc.) pre-
dicted an unfavorable short-term outcome of depression,
independent of classic ratings of symptom severity. Most
excitingly, the analysis of patients’ and interviewers’
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of depression, as was shown in individuals with remitted
depression, whereby a reduction in nonverbal convergence
predicted relapse within a 2-year follow-up period [56].
These examples clearly suggest that the analysis of nonver-
bal and paraverbal signals during therapeutic interaction
can be more informative than subjective report or infor-
mation obtained by using standardized rating scales. This
probably resides in the fact that nonverbal behavior is less
under conscious control compared to verbal communica-
tion, such that an individual’s “real” motives cannot so eas-
ily be concealed [57,58]. In addition, standard rating scales
utilized in clinical assessments usually lump together sub-
jective report and clinical impression. However, although
clinicians intuitively use their species-specific endowments
for deciphering nonverbal expressions in therapist–client
interactions, the extent to which clinical judgments rely
on the unconscious perception of patients’ communicative
signals is unclear and highly under-researched in clinical
psychiatry [59].
Discussion
Fifty years ago, ethologist Nicolaas Tinbergen provided
biology with a framework of the aims and methods of
ethology, which, at that time, was the spearhead of con-
temporary research of behaviour. The appreciation of
Tinbergen’s four “Whys”, the proximate and evolutionary
mechanisms of behavior, by other behavioral sciences has
been mixed. In spite of several attempts to promote the
usefulness of Tinbergen’s approach to the understanding
of cognition, emotion and behavior of humans e.g., [60],
psychiatry has been curiously unaware of the prospects
and opportunities inherent to Tinbergen’s ethological
methodology for improving the understanding and ther-
apy of psychiatric conditions. This is, in part, understand-
able, because psychiatrists, with a background in medical
education, are trained to see psychiatric phenomena as
diseases, as well as pathological deviations from a (un-
specified) biological and or social norm. They have much
more difficulties in appreciating that some phenomena are
better conceptualized as defenses or interpersonal strat-
egies (whereby the term “strategy” does not imply con-
scious reflection or awareness) that have been shaped by a
long history of evolutionary development.
This article proposes that evolutionary approaches con-
tribute important insights into how the human mind has
been shaped by selection and how human mentality may
be (or not!) adapted to ancient and modern environments.
One possible pitfall is to conceive of evolutionary pro-
cesses as optimal by design. Instead, some features that
have been selected at one time may produce vulnerability
to dysfunction. For example, low mood or anxiety can be
useful in situations, in which conflict is inevitable, or when
important biosocial goals become unattainable. Similar toadaptive defenses such as pain, coughing, vomiting, and
fatigue, psychological mechanisms such as low mood,
withdrawal or fear can help protect the individual from an
escalation of conflict and further harm, however, at the ex-
pense of subjective wellbeing. Evolution by selection pro-
cesses ultimately maximized survival and reproduction,
not health or wellbeing [61]. This can distort or blind the
therapist’s vision with regard to the function of emotions,
cognitions and behavior.
Human psychology depends on the complex interplay of
genes and early environmental conditions. In particular,
the emotional availability of early care-givers coins an indi-
vidual’s mindsets in terms of one’s ability (or disability) to
form trustful and reciprocal relationships with peers, part-
ners, colleagues and additional significant others. Research
into the behavioral ecology of humans has demonstrated
the enormous flexibility in shaping developmental path-
ways, including the timing of biological maturation,
mating, and the quality of parenting behavior. In spite of
potential risks for mental health associated with such
differential susceptibility, the fact that there is a large po-
tential of environmental malleability of psychological de-
velopment – for better and worse – opens new horizons
for prevention and treatment of psychiatric conditions.
Identifying and promoting favorable early rearing condi-
tions is one such approach in preventing or reducing the
vulnerability or liability to developing mental disorders.
Moreover, it is more holistic and scientifically complete to
consider and help patients understand that problems are
not simply related to genetics and adversity (as the classic
diathesis-stress approach would suggest), but a complex
interaction between genetic variants that may or may not
increase one’s responsivity to both good and bad envi-
ronmental conditions. In this way, patients’ resultant
strengths may be identified and optimized. Being endowed
with genes that make one more responsive to envi-
ronmental input could potentially be turned into a thera-
peutic advantage, that is, greater responsivity to therapeutic
intervention.
Another under-used area for clinicians to utilize is the
importance of non- and paraverbal signals during patient-
therapist interaction. It is clear that therapeutic effort is
mainly executed through verbal discourse. However, it
would be useful to educate and encourage clinicians to
utilize more information from nonverbal behavior, espe-
cially in light of claims that roughly 70% of communica-
tion during social interaction is transported via nonverbal
channels, 25% paraverbally, as opposed to just 5% of infor-
mation that is verbally expressed [57].
Summary
To conclude, Tinbergen has bequeathed us a more accur-
ate, informed, holistic and predictive scientific framework
that not only advances our understanding of psychiatric
Brüne BMC Psychiatry  (2014) 14:1695 Page 7 of 8conditions, but also improves psychiatrists’ concepts of
how a diagnosis should be framed and furthermore sug-
gests proposals for the identification and targeting of treat-
ments of those mental disorders [62,63]. It also has the
potential for a considerable impact on medicine in general
[5]. It is therefore hugely important to educate all doctors,
and psychiatrists in particular, about evolutionary theory,
especially Tinbergen’s approach. This should then be
reflected in the curricula of medical schools and post-
graduate studies, for the benefit of all, especially our
patients.
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